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Article 9

VICTIMLESS CRIMES: THE THRESHOLD QUESTION AND BEYOND
I. Introduction
"Victimless crimes" have been defined as
those nonforceful offenses where the conduct subjected to control is committed by adult participants who are not willing to complain about their
participation in the conduct, and no direct injury is inflicted upon other
persons not participating in the prescribed conduct.'
This definition reveals three aspects of such crimes. First, they proscribe consensual conduct between adult participants. Second, no person involved in the
transaction is willing to act as a complaining witness. Finally, the conduct involves no direct injury to non-participants. These criteria of a victimless crime
can be best illustrated by contrasting a victimless offense with a traditionally
recognized criminal act. For example, in the case of a criminal assault, the basis
of the state's legal reaction is unambiguous. An individual comes forward and
demands redress of his grievances by pressing charges. However, an offense
committed by consenting adult homosexuals presents a far different prosecutorial
situation. There is no "complaining witness" to protest the conduct even though
it may violate the criminal code.
In a sense, American criminal law recognizes this distinction by speaking in
terms of two conceptually different types of prohibited conduct: that which is
malum in se (evil in itself), and conduct which is malum prohibitum (evil
because prohibited).' Malum in se conduct, such as murder, rape, arson, assault
and like offenses, is universally considered criminal in the sense that the prohibition of such conduct clearly bears a direct relationship to the protection of
the person and property of each member of society. But much of our criminal
codes is concerned with conduct that is not universally considered evil. This
malum prohibitum legislation does not protect distinct individual interests, but
society nevertheless regards the conduct as sufficiently undesirable to subject it
to the criminal sanction.
These observations represent the point of departure for the controversial
debate concerning the appropriateness of victimless crimes. The necessity of
malum in se legislation is not subject to challenge since no society can tolerate
such behavior and survive. Similarly, certain malum prohibitum measures,
traffic regulations, for example, are clearly dictated by a prudential concern for
societal order. However, victimless crimes represent those malum prohibitum
measures which are not limited to a morally neutral concern for necessary, functional order. Rather, victimless crimes are the legislative embodiment of society's
moral evaluation of certain conduct. The traditional objects of such legislation
1 Decker, The Consideration of an Absolute Defense or Mitigation in Crimes Without
Victims, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Decker.
2 The analysis of victimless crimes in terms of malum prohibitum acts is suggested in
Smith and Pollack, Crimes Without Victims, SATURDAY REVIEW, Dec. 4, 1971, at 27 [hereinafter cited as Smith & Pollack].
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have been prostitution, sexual relations, gambling, public drunkenness, and drug
abuse.
Thus, victimless crimes are distinguished from other classes of malum
prohibitum conduct by the degree to which they involve an element of legislated
morality. This distinction raises the fourth and final characteristic of victimless
crimes: they are crimes based on moral codes.3 This use of the criminal sanction
to punish immorality, a phenomenon H.L.A. Hart describes as "legal moralism,"
represents the central issue in the long and heated philosophical debate concerning victimless crimes.
II. The Concept of "Harm to Others"
There are two principal philosophical views concerning the proper connection between law and morals. The moralist school is best represented by Sir
Arthur Patrick Devlin.4 The opposing view is represented by the collective works
of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and H.L.A. Hart,5 who are characterized
as utilitarians.
Devlin's moralist thesis views legal moralism as permissible on the very
principle which underlies the justification of malum in se legislation; namely,
that any society may take appropriate steps necessary to preserve its own existence. "A recognized morality," he asserts, "is as necessary to society's existence
as a recognized government."' Thus, a shared morality is an essential characteristic of ordered society, and immorality-even immoral acts carried out in
private-jeopardize society's existence. Accordingly, Devlin concludes that
society is justified in legislating morality.
In contrast,' the basis of the utilitarian argument is contained in John Stuart
Mill's celebrated maxim: "The only purpose for which power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a civilized society against his will is to prevent
harm to others." 8 In contemporary jurisprudence, this principle has found its
most notable exposition in H.L.A. Hart's seminal work, Law, Liberty, and
Morality.9 But, Hart is only one example of Mill's continuing influence in
modern legal thought.'
Moreover, Mill's impact has not been limited to philosophical circles. An
3 The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has expressly defined victimless crime
as "crime based on moral codes in which there is no victim apart from the person who committed it." Reported in NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1971, at 83.
4 See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959) [hereinafter cited as
DEVLIN].

5 See generally J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Harrison ed.
1948); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY '(1963).

6 DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 13-14.
7 For an extensive analysis of the moralist/utilitarian debate, see Comment, Private
Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of
Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581 (1967). See also Blackshield, The Hart-Devlin Controversy
in 1965, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 441 (1967).
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY chapter I.
See also Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1967).
8

9

10 See, e.g., H.
cited as PACKER.]
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excellent example is Great Britain's famous Wolfenden Report," concerning
homosexual offenses and prostitution which clearly reflects Mill's "harm to
others" emphasis. The Report emphasized that the proper function of law
is to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is
offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others.... It is not.., the function of law to intervene
in the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern
of behavior ... 12
In the United States, the Reporters of the American Law Institute similarly
proposed a limitation on the enforcement of morality in thei 1955 Model Penal
Code." The recommendation was that "all sexual practices not involving force,
adult corruption of minors, or public offense" should be excluded from criminal
proscription. This proposal was based on the premise, among others, that "no
harm to the secular interests of the community is involved."' 4
Hence, Mill's notion that "harm to others" is a prerequisite to the imposition of the criminal sanction has become a basic concept in the criticism of
victimless crimes. Professor Herbert L. Packer 5 suggests that the "harm to
others" formula has two uses that justify its inclusion as a limiting criterion for
the invocation of the criminal sanction. First, it is a way to insure that a given
form of conduct is not subjected to the criminal sanction purely or even primarily
because it is thought to be immoral. It accomplishes this by forcing an inquiry
into the specific social "harm" sought to be avoided by the legislation. 6 Second,
it focuses attention on whether it is more "harmful" to prohibit the conduct
than to allow it.'" These two uses, concludes Professor Packer, establish the
"harm to others" test as a threshold question concerning the appropriate limits
of the criminal sanction.' s
As Packer's comments imply, any critical discussion of victimless crimes
must proceed beyond the threshold question of requisite harm to a second level
of inquiry. This second level poses the ultimate legal question raised by the
victimless crimes' debate. This ultimate concern is not whether a society should
legislate morality, but rather what are the appropriate limits of public policy. 9
Even assuming that the harm resulting from a particular act philosophically
and pragmatically justifies the imposition of legal penalties, it must still be shown
that this imposition does not contravene constitutionally protected rights.2
In review, the "harm to others" debate between the moralist and utilitarian
schools raises three important analytical criteria with which to examine victimless
11

COMMITTEE

247 (1957)
12
13
14
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REPORT,

C.M.D. No.

(WOLFENDEN

Id. at 9-10.
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Id. at § 207.5, comment.
PACKER, supra note 10.
Id. at 267.
Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE

Id.

19 See, e.g., Newhaus, Sense and Nonsense About Victimless Crimes, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
March 7, 1973, at 282 [hereinafter cited as Newhaus].
20 See, e.g., Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of Criminally Protected Interests, 4 DUQUESNE U. L. REV. 345, 413 (1966).
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crimes. First, it forces an inquiry into precisely what bad effects are feared; that
is the harm to others. Second, it focuses attention on the effects of subjecting
the conduct to criminal prohibition. Finally, and most importantly from the
civil liberties perspective, it raises the critical question concerning the appropriate
limits of public policy as defined by the Constitution. The balance of this note
will pursue these issues through a discussion of specific problem areas in victimless crimes.
III. Addressing the Threshold Question
A. The Objectives of Victimless Crime Statutes: Unfulfilled Goals
Prostitution is one of the perennial focal points of the victimless crimes
debate. Among the asserted "bad effects" justifying legal measures against the
oldest profession are its promotion of secondary crime and the link between
prostitution and venereal disease. The advocates of legal proscription also cite
the positive interests fostered by such laws. These interests basically reduce to
a humanistic concern for the prostitute, the exploited customer, and the prostitute's children.2 '
However, an examination of the actual impact of prostitution laws points to
the fact that prohibitive legislation has not effectively met any of these objectives.
As John Decker points out, "When prostitution is suppressed by the penal law, it
is not eliminated, it is merely dispersed into other areas."" As a result, prostitutes continue to be assaulted and beaten." Drug addiction 4 and venereal
disease" continue to an alarming degree. The children of the prostitute are
seldom given adequate care.' 6
Nor does prohibition effect a reduction in secondary crime. Prostitutes
themselves often commit crimes against their customers, in some instances resulting in beatings and murders." A study of New York streetwalkers, for example,
showed that 40 per cent of those arrested had records of previous arrests for
crimes besides prostitution, including drug offenses, burglary, larceny, robbery,
and homicide.' 8
Laws prohibiting the use of drugs are plagued by similar difficulties. As in
the case of prostitution, the rigorous enforcement of drug laws is often counterproductive in controlling actual direct injury to the individual and society. For
example, the causal connection between the prohibition of drug traffic, illicit
street prices, and secondary crime have been well-documented."
21 See Decker, supra note 1, at 48.
22 Id.
23 See George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerationsin the Control of Prostitution, 60 MICH. L. REV. 717, 718 (1962).
24 See Thornton, Organized Crime in the Field of Prostitution, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & C.S.
775 (1956).
25 See M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 264 (1951).
26 See Lindsay, Prostitution-Delinquency's Time Bomb, 16 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 153
(1970).
27 See Decker, supra note 1, at 48 and references therein.
28 See E. KIESTER, CRIMES WITH No VICTIMS 37-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
KIESTER].
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Moreover, the laws against prostitution, drugs, and gambling have created
a situation in which a tremendous organized crime industry thrives on satisfying
a customer demand that cannot be met legitimately."0 This observation can be.
supported historically by citing the effect of the prohibition imposed by the
eighteenth amendment." Not only was the law virtually ineffective in reducing
per capita alcohol consumption,3" but it created an extensive bootlegging industry
which served as the basis of organized crime throughout the era."
These criticisms variously express the fact that the passage and enforcement
of many victimless crimes laws actually create victims by forcing the activities
underground into an aimosphere which is conducive to secondary crime. In
other words, the basic problem is not the bad effect of the conduct in question,
but the intolerable effect of its prohibition. Thus, it seems clear that far from
preventing harm to others, the laws tend to actually inflict it.
B. The Effects of Criminalization: A High Price to Pay
Further objections to victimless crimes relate to what the Honorable Sol
Wachtler describes as their "high cost." 4 This cost derives from five basic
sources: the financial and judicial burdens they impose, the logistical and constitutional problems of enforcement, and the ineffective nature of the laws
themselves.
According to one estimate, California alone spent $100 million during 1970
to enforce the laws against the possession of marijuana. " The San Francisco
Committee on Crime computed that in 1969 it cost the city a minimum of
$893,000 for arresting and jailing drunks, and $379,000 for dealing with prostitutes." On a national scale, it was estimated that in 1970 victimless crimes accounted for $20 billion of the nation's $51 billion annual crime bill.3
A second cost of victimless crimes is the critical burden they place on the
already over-burdened criminal justice system. American courts are confronted
with the serious problem of an increasing volume of criminal cases which they are
ill-equipped to accommodate. In 1970, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
handled 32,419 felonies, almost double the number before that same court just
five years earlier. 8 During that same period its felony backlog increased nearly
two and one-half times, from 2,761 cases in 1966 to 6,559 in 1970."" Courts
across the nation report similar difficulties.40
One of the principal causes of this increasing backlog is the great number of
petty offenses which consume the courts' time. These consist primarily of vari30 See Smith & Pollack, supra note 2, at 28.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Wachtler, The High Cost of Victimless Crimes, 28 RECORD N.Y. BAR .Ass'N 357 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Wachtler].
35 KIESTER, supra note 28, 4-5.
36 THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NON-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN
FRANCISCO (April 26, 1971).
37 KIESTER, supra note 28, at 5.
38 ABA REPORT, supra note 29, at 67.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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ous victimless offenses, a fact substantiated by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.4 As President Nixon declared
in 1971:
We have to find ways to clear the courts of the endless stream of
"victimless crimes" that get in the way of serious consideration of serious
42
crime.
Added to this judicial cost is the misallocation of enforcement resources.
The FBI reported that in 1971 there were 1.8 million arrests for the "crime"
of public drunkenness.4 3 This represents a substantial diversion of police time,
personnel, and resources, at a time when the volume of serious crime continues to
increase. 4 ' To many observers, such statistics provide proof that the nation's
crime-plagued cities can no longer afford to regulate public morality at the
expense of public safety.45
The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption" suggests yet another
problem posed by victimless crimes. The Report recommended that criminal
sanctions against various victimless crimes should be repealed because of the correlation between such laws and corrupt police practices. The Commission explained that these laws are particularly difficult to enforce because the "victims"
of the crimes are usually willing participants and seldom complain to the police.
Consequently, if a police officer, for whatever reason, decides to condone a violation, he need only fail to report it. Such a situation, concluded the Commission,
is "an invitation to corruption.'
The inherent difficulty of enforcing victimless crimes laws also raises serious
civil liberties considerations. Since there are no victims available to testify for the
state, victimless crimes pose unique problems of enforcement. As Professor
Packer characterizes the problem: "To the difficulties of apprehending a
criminal when it is known he has committed a crime are added the difficulties
of knowing that a crime has been committed. ' 48 Moreover, the lack of a complaining witness usually places the entire burden of producing evidence on-law
enforcement agencies. These two facts have led to "creative" enforcement techniques which have made victimless crimes the greatest single source of civil
liberties' violations.49
41

See

THE

PRESIDENT'S

COMMasISSION

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT.

report:
42

ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

THE COURTS 106 (1967).
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Address by President Richard M.

OF

See also the Commission's general

(1967).

Nixon, The National Conference of the Judiciary

(March 11, 1971).
43 Derived from Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1971).
44 Id.
45 See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1971, at 83.
46 COaIsaISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S
(KNAPP COMMsISSION REPORT).
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMAISSION REPORT (1972)
47 Id. at 18.
48 PACKER, supra note 10, at 151.
49 E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (gambling); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963) (narcotics); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (narcotics); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (gambling); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 370
(1958) (narcotics); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (gambling); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (narcotics); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (nar-
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Prostitutes and drug users, for example, are frequently the objects of entrapment by plainclothesmen."0 Further, police records indicate that an incredible number of gamblers and drug possessors "drop" gambling slips and
narcotics at the mere approach of a policeman. 5 This so-called "dropsie
evidence" recorded on the police records is frequently a euphemism for an illegal
search, 2 a fact suggested by the dramatic increase in the incidence of police
"dropsie" reports since 1961 when the United States Supreme Court banned the
admission of illegally seized evidence in Mapp v. Ohio.53 Thus, the result appears to be a trade-off between victimless crimes legislation and the protection
of civil liberties; that is, effective enforcement is inversely proportional to constitutional guarantees. Norval Morris terms the net result of this phenomenon
surrounding the enforcement of victimless crime laws a general "enervation of
the Constitution":
Police work is almost by definition more difficult in cases of victimless
crime; the best evidence is lacking, no injured citizen complains to the
police and serves as a witness. The police must therefore "develop" cases
with unreliable informers, undercover work, tapping and bugging, entrapment and decoy methods, swift seizure of evidence and forceful interrogation. Drug cases account for most of our constitutional difficulties with
search and seizure . . . gambling cases account for most instances of wiretapping and other invasions of privacy. Attempting to balance, in these
tilted scales, constitutional concerns for privacy and due process with a
concern for police effectiveness has lessened for the rest of us the protection
of our constitutional rights. In the long run, this enervation of the Constitution may not be the least of the harms flowing from the overreach of
the criminal law.54
A second constitutional question raised by enforcement techniques centers
on police harassment of suspected offenders. Particularly in the enforcement of
laws against gambling and prostitution, police tactics are often aimed not at
prosecution and conviction but at making life difficult for suspects. Such a
practice is objectionable because it effectively constitutes punishment without
a determination of guilt, raising due process questions.55 Although the practice
has not, as yet, been challenged on these grounds, it seems apparent that the
cotics); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1938), 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (smuggled
alcohol); Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (gambling); Lefkowitz v. United
States, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (prohibition); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(prohibition).
Citing these and other cases, Professor Sanford H. Kadish points out that the judicial
response to these violations has been the imposition of severe restrictions on police enforcement techniques in general. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 Am. CRMs. L.Q.
17, 26 (1968). This could be termed an additional "cost."
50 See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL chapter III (1966).
51 See Smith & Pollack, supra note 2, at 28-29; see also KiESTER, supra note 28, at 11.
52 Id. See also Comment, Police Perjury In Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility
Gap, 60 Gno. L.J. 507 (1971).
53 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note, Effect of Mapp o. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUA. J.L. & Soc. PROBLEMS 87 (1968).
54 Morris, Crimes Without Victims: Law as a Busybody, CURRENT, June 1973, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Morris].
55 W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 450 (1965);
PACKER, supra note 10, at 293.
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basis of such a challenge exists in the case of systematic harassment of an individual or group of individuals.
Finally, victimless crimes offenses are subject to a third constitutional challenge which lies in the apparently discriminatory manner in which many of the
laws are enforced. Again, because of their complainantless nature, the enforcement of such laws is largely discretionary. As a result the laws are usually enforced, if at all, on terms that suggest racial and class bias." Almost 70 per cent
of those arrested on gambling charges are black, well out of proportion to the
country's black population. 7 With respect to prostitution, during one "crackdown" period in New York only 6 per cent of the prostitution arrests were of
customers; 58 furthermore, the penalties imposed are generally far greater for the
prostitute than for those using her services." In addition, studies of prostitution
reveal that one segment of the prostitution population-the "call girls" who serve
upper class customers, are generally ignored by law enforcement officers for
political reasons.6"
If, in fact, the police are deliberately applying these laws in this manner, it
seems clear that their action violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 6 However, the validity of many of these allegations must be eyed
with caution. It seems apparent that the prostitute would be subject to a higher
incidence of arrest simply because she is much more "visible" than her customer.
The same is true of the difference between the "call girl" and the common
streetwalker. Since she is on the street all night, the streetwalker is much more
prone to arrest than her "upper class" sister, whose services can be solicited
discreetly. The apparent disparity of punishment between prostitutes and their
customers may be explained by reflecting on the relative number of "first offense"
prostitutes compared with "first offense" customers; the conclusion is apparent.
Similarly, different gambling practices, drinking habits and habitations, and
assorted drug use all have characteristic probabilities of arrest that are inherent.
It seems at least plausible that Richard Neuhaus apprehends the central problem
manifest in such "de facto" discrimination: "If there is injustice here, it is rooted
not in the law but in a profoundly unequal economic system. How that can be
corrected is another matter."6 2
But there remains the possibility that the discriminatory enforcement is, in
fact, engendered by political and social considerations cognizantly undertaken
by enforcement officials. If so, their action is undoubtedly in violation of the
Constitution.
The last and most pressing cost of victimless crimes lies in the ineffective
nature of the laws themselves. After discussing the other costs of victimless
crimes, the San Francisco Committee on Crime concluded: "If these expendi56 Morris, supra note 54, at 7.
57 Id.
58 Robey, Politics and Criminal Law: Revision of New York State Penal Law on Prostitution, 17 Soc. PROB. 83, 97 (1969).
59 Id.
60 Id. See also HOBBINS, HUSER, & JOHNSON,
AMERICAN LAW 1971/72 (Part 1) 93 (1972).
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61 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d
616 (7th Cir. 1973).
62 Newhaus, supra note 19, at 284.
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tures achieved some social or public good, they should be gladly borne. But they
do not."6
A case in point is the "Washington Six" report, a special report on six
habitual drunks in Washington, D.C. 4 The report showed that these six
offenders had been arrested a total of 1,409 times and had collectively served
125 years in the city's penal institutions. But after all of this, they were still
chronic drunks, offenders who would continue the same "revolving door" process.
Judge Wachtler identifies the crux of this problem by noting that enforcement of the laws has no deterrent or rehabilitative effect on the habitual
offenders, who characterize many victimless crimes. 5 "Those who are incapable
of changing their behavior voluntarily," he points out, "are unaffected by our
criminal laws." 6 Thus, Judge Wachtler concludes that, in essence, "they are
67
being oppressed by society, little more-and we are accomplishing nothing."
In fact, by enforcing some of the laws, the condition of the offender may
actually be worsened. American penal institutions have achieved general
notoriety as "schools of crime."6 8 It is especially paradoxical that many offenders
should be "punished" by subjecting them to a medium which is perhaps best
suited to the continuance of their particular crime. The prison drug culture is
a case in point. 9 Similarly, the appropriateness of placing a homosexual offender
in prison must be questioned. As Justice Graven of North Carolina ironically
0
pointed out in Perkins v. North Carolina:"

Putting [the accused] into the North Carolina prison system is a little like
throwing Brer Rabbit into the brierpatch. Most doctors who have studied
homosexuality agree that prison environment... aggravates and strengthens
homosexual
tendencies and provides unexcelled opportunity for homosexual
practice. 7 1
The observations of Judges Wachtler and Craven go beyond the threshold
question of harm to the second level of inquiry: the appropriate limits of public
policy. The fact that many offenders are being oppressed by victimless crime
laws raises serious questions concerning the constitutionality of the laws themselves. The balance of this inquiry will survey these constitutional issues.
IV. Beyond the Threshold Question
After addressing the threshold question of requisite harm, one encounters
four related questions concerning the criminalization of victimless offenses: the
limits of public policy, the right to privacy, the aspect of cruel and unusual
63 SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NO'N-VICTIM
FRANCISCO (April 26, 1971).
64 Reported in NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1971, at 83.
65 Wachtler, supra note 34-,
at 359.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
GOALS, A NATIONAL STAmGY TO REDUCE CRIME 132 (1973).
69 See generally R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO (1975).
70 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
71 Id. at 339.
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punishment, and the right to treatment. These concerns go beyond the wisdom
of criminalization to the constitutionality of the laws themselves.
A. Substantive Due Process: The Limits of Public Policy
One of the central tenets of any free society is that government may act
7
the United
only for valid public purposes. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
States Supreme Court enunciated this principle as constitutional doctrine. In
Parrish, the Court held that governmental power is limited to activities impinging on the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The exercise
of governmental authority to effect these purposes is generally referred to as the
police power.
Victimless crime statutes are restrictions imposed on individual conduct
under the guise of the police power. While this power is one of the broadest
possessed by the state, its exercise is not unlimited. The fixed limit and basic
standard by which the validity of an exercise of the police power is measured is
one of "reasonableness," a requirement which derives from the basic constitutional guarantee of due process. 7' This due process requirement of reasonableness
has beeen interpreted as establishing two conditions which must be satisfied to
justify the exercise of the police power over an individual: first, it is necessary
that the interests of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare require
such interference; and, second, that the legislative means adopted are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes and not unduly oppressive
upon the individual.74 If a police regulation fails in any respect to satisfy these
requirements, it has long been held that it is the duty of a reviewing court to give
7
effect to the Constitution and overturn the statute. "
Since the 1930's the Court has evidenced increasing reluctance to entertain
a substantive due process argument that would use the due process clause to strike
down economic or social welfare legislation.7 ' Nevertheless, with respect to legislation which infringes upon the personal liberty of the individual, the Court
has continued to require a demonstrable nexus between the proscription and
the public interest. 7 Although it is difficult to delineate with precision the line
between the protected autonomy of the individual and the authority of the state
to enact laws in the general interest of the public, it is firmly established that the
police power may not unreasonably invade private rights." The state thus has
no power to arbitrarily invade the personal rights and liberty of the individual
citizen.7 ' To justify such an intrusion, some public necessity must be demonstrated."0
72 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
73 See Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
74 See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1961).
75 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1926); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1904).
76 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
77 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1964).
See also Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea For a New Look at Substantive Due Process, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490 (1971).
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Thus, in Bates v. City of Little Rock,"' the Supreme Court asserted that
when it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom, it becomes the duty of the Court to determine
whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the governmental purpose
asserted as its justification. The Court went on to hold that: "Where there is
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
may prevail only upon
82
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.3
These limitations on the proper scope of the police power raise constitutional
questions concerning victimless crime statutes. As previously discussed,83 it is
difficult if not impossible to demonstrate any compelling state interest which
justifies the imposition of the criminal sanction in many such cases. As John
Decker asks, "How can such acts as homosexual conduct between two consenting
adults be cloaked in public interest ramifications?" 4 Moreover, even if public
interest ramifications are discernible, it is by no means clear that criminal prohibition is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the asserted governmental purposes underlying the laws. Finally, it does seem clear that the laws
are unduly oppressive as applied to many offenders. The ineffective nature of
the laws as well as their counterproductiveness attests to these facts. Decriminalization is thus not only the first step in framing a more rational and effective
public policy in the area of victimless crimes, but also the first step towards a
course of dealing in the area which is in substantive harmony with the Constitution.
More recently, however, constitutional challenges to victimless crimes have
been on narrower grounds than the inherent limitations of the police power.
These arguments stem from recent judicial decisions emphasizing particular
rights which are constitutionally reserved to the individual.
B. The Right to Privacy
An area of increasing controversy in the victimless crimes debate derives
from the recent judicial development of a constitutionally protected right to
privacy. The private and consensual nature of many victimless offenses raises
an intuitive objection to criminal prohibition of such activity, and recent judicial
refinement of the right to privacy has given such objections constitutional impact.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,85 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of defendants who gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons concerning birth control techniques. In reversing the conviction,
the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute of Civil War vintage which banned
the use of contraceptives. Mr. Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, reasoned that the statute was unconstitutional since it prohibited activity
which is "within the zone of privacy created by constitutional guarantees."8
Thus, the Court extended express constitutional recognition to "the right to be
81
82
83
84
85
86
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left alone-the
most comprehensive and the right most valued by civilized
87
man."
Justice Douglas noted that while the Constitution does not expressly recognize such a right, "that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."8 8 That
is, the specifically enumerated rights give rise to "penumbras" creating "zones of
privacy," and therein lie the bases of a distinct, constitutionally protected rightthe right of privacy. The ninth amendment's reservation of "unenumerated
rights," he added, further suggested this interpretation.
The Supreme Court further extended the concept of constitutionally pro9
tected privacy in several later decisions. Stanley v. Georgia,"
decided in 1969,
involved the conviction of a person for possessing obscene movies in his home.
The Court found this to be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, stating that
"whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we
do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home." 90 The Court later
made clear, however, in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,9 ' that this doctrine did
not protect the public exhibition of obscene movies.
In Roe v. Wade,92 the Court concluded that the constitutional right to
privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."9 Although the Court noted that the right involved is
not unlimited, the decision further illustrates that there are definite areas of
private conduct between consenting adults which are constitutionally beyond the
reach of criminal statutes.
Moreover, the Griswold Court emphasized that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities may not be achieved by a means which is unnecessarily broad and thereby invades the area of protected freedom.94 These principles suggest the constitutional difficulties inherent in laws which prohibit prostitution, gambling, certain sexual practices, and private possession of drugs.
In some instances, lower courts have demonstrated receptiveness to this
rationale. In State v. Kantner," three of the five justices of the Hawaii Supreme
Court voiced the view that a state statute prohibiting the private use of marijuana
was unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld only
because one judge, Justice Abe, felt that the issue had been improperly raised.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Alaska did in fact find a similar law unconstitutional as an impermissible invasion of privacy.9
The principles embodied in these cases are applicable to other victimless
crimes. In Cotner v. Henry,17 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit vacated a conviction for sodomy. The defendant had entered a guilty
87
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plea to the charge but had challenged the constitutionality of the criminal statute
as a violation of his marital right of privacy. In reaching its decision, the court
noted that there had been no mention of force in the complaint, and that the
state had made no clear showing of a compelling state interest in preventing the
act of sodomy. It concluded that: "The import of the Griswold decision is that
private, consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the state
through the use of a criminal penalty.""8
In 1972, the Supreme Court made clear that the right to privacy enunciated
in Griswold was not limited to the marital relationship. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,9
the Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives
by unmarried couples was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection as well
as a constitutionally impermissible invasion of privacy. This decision made clear
that the focus of the right to privacy is not upon the marital status of the participants, but upon the private, consensual nature of the prohibited conduct.
Thus, in Lovisi v. Slayton,' a Virginia federal district court relied on Eisenstadt
for the view that:
It is not the marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal the
sexual behavior of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself
or something intensely private to the individual that calls forth constitutional
protection. While the condition of marriage would doubtless make more
difficult an attempt by government to justify an intrusion upon sexual
behavior,0 this condition is not a prerequisite to the operation of the right of
privacy. 1
This expanded view of the right to privacy suggests that other types of
private, consensual adult sexual behavior may be similarly beyond the reach of
0
criminal prohibition. In United States v. Binns,"'
for example, the District of
Columbia Superior Court struck down a statute prohibiting solicitation for "lewd
or immoral conduct." In reaching its decision, the court cited, among other
reasons, that no compelling state interest had been advanced to justify the state's
invasion of the privacy of the prostitutes and homosexuals whose activities were
proscribed. Similarly, the Maryland federal district court has suggested that the
prohibition of private homosexual conduct might be both an infringement of
liberty protected by due process and a violation of the right to privacy, although
it denied relief to a homosexual school teacher on other grounds.'
In sum, it is apparent that the right to privacy will have a profound impact
on the entire spectrum of victimless crimes. Many observers have concluded that
the application of criminal laws to conduct carried on in private is constitutionally suspect. An increasing willingness of the courts to view other victimless
offenses in the light of Griswold and its progeny will undoubtedly transform this
suspicion into holding.
98 Id. at 875; see also Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969).
99 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
100 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (however, the court ruled that the defendants
had waived their right of privacy by allowing photographs of their acts of sodomy to fall into
the hands of their children).
101 Id. at 625.
102 11 CRIMi. L. RPTR. 2335 (1972).
103 Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
A second area in which victimless crimes conflict with constitutionally
protected rights lies in the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment." Traditionally, this provision has been interpreted as
prohibiting sanctions which involve unnecessary cruelty and pain,' or punishment which is substantially disproportionate to the offense for which it was imposed.'
More recently, the provision has been interpreted as a bar to sanctions
which are arbitrarily or not usually imposed.0 6 It is significant to note that the
punishment of victimless crimes has been challenged on each of these grounds.
1. Proportionality and Arbitrariness
In Weems v. United States,'11 the Supreme Court struck down, excessive
under the eighth amendment, a 15-year sentence for falsifying public documents. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that other existing crimes,
including several degrees of homicide and suspicion of treason, were not punished
as severely. This fact, observed the Court, violated the basic "precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."'0 8
Similar objections have been raised concerning the punishments applied to
many victimless crimes. As Chief Judge Craven posed the qiuestion in Perkins
v. North Carolina:'09
Is there any public purpose served by a possible sixty year maximum or
even five year minimum imprisonment of the occasional or one-time homosexual... ? Are homosexuals twice as dangerous to society as second degree
murderers-as indicated by the maximum sentence for each offense?" 0
Although Perkins was decided on other grounds, there is an increasing tendency
by the courts to answer these questions in the negative.
Recent decisions by the Michigan Supreme Court illustrate this fact. In
People v. Sinclair,"' the court reversed the conviction of a defendant who had
been sentenced to 9/2 to 10 years in prison for possession of marijuana. Two
justices voted for reversal expressly because the sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.
In a later decision, People v. Lorentzen,"' the Michigan court held that a
20-year minimum term of imprisonment for the sale of marijuana was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court compared this sanction with those imposed
for similar offenses under Michigan laws prohibiting the illicit sale or distribution
of unlawful substances, as well as with the punishment imposed for more serious
104
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offenses in Michigan. Finally, the court took notice of the fact that other states
had recently reduced their drug penalty statutes. As a result of this analysis,
the court concluded that the statutory penalty imposed upon Lorentzen was so
grossly disproportionate to the offense that it violated both the federal and state
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia" has focused
judicial concern on sentencing procedures which produce arbitrary and inequitable results. In People v. McCabe,"4 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the classification of marijuana under the Illinois Narcotic Control Act
rather than under the Drug Abuse Control Act was arbitrary and a denial of
equal protection. The basis of the court's decision was the fact that the Narcotic
Control Act provided for a mandatory 10-year sentence, whereas under the Drug
Abuse statute a one-year maximum sentence was imposed.
Nor is this concern limited to drug cases. Arbitrariness in sentencing is also
a matter of increasing comment in prostitution, gambling, and public drunkenness, with critics pointing out that the sentence imposed on particular defendants
often suggests racial and class bias." 5
2. Unnecessary Cruelty
Perhaps the most serious constitutional deprivation inflicted on many victimless crimes offenders is raised by the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v.
California."' At issue in that case was a California statute which made it a
criminal offense to be addicted to narcotics; violations were punishable by a
mandatory ninety-day jail sentence.
Robinson was arrested in Los Angeles by police, whom he told that he used
narcotics; his arms bore what appeared to be hypodermic needle marks. He was
charged with a violation of the statute on these facts alone and sentenced to
jail. On appeal, Robinson's counsel successfully raised the "cruel and unusual
punishment" issue on the grounds that the law did not require proof of purchase
or use of the drugs. Accepting this argument for the majority, Mr. Justice
Stewart declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. As he viewed it, the statute fell into the same category
as one purporting to make it a criminal offense "for a person to be mentally ill,
or a leper, or to be afflicted with venereal disease."" 7 In applying the pertinent
provision of the eighth amendment, he held:
[A] state which. imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though
he had never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of
any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
In a significant concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas regarded Robinson's
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conviction of being an addict, rather than his confinement, as the specific "cruel
and unusual punishment."
The Court's decision in Robinson appeared to be a watershed for opponents
of victimless crimes, who argued that its rationale should be extended to other
offenses which constitute "conviction by force of habit.""' 9 Although the lower
courts have maintained a cautious attitude toward such arguments, the extension
of Robinson does have adherents on the bench. For example, although the
petition in Lloyd v. United States... was denied, Chief Judge Bazelon dissented
that the principles set forth in Robinson should be extended to include possession
of heroin. Judge Bazelon synthesized the problem by asking "whether punishment of an addict . . . whose purchase and possession of narcotic drugs is ex-

plained entirely by his need for them, is cruel and unusual punishment."''
In partial response to this question, his dissent continues:
[O]n the one hand, the Robinson opinion is replete with dicta affirming the
right of the states to punish possession or actual use of narcotic drugs in unauthorized situations. On the other, I am not able to distinguish in any
meaningful sense the punishment of an addict and the punishment of an
22
addict for buying and possessing the drugs his body compellingly craves.'
This same concern was voiced by Chief Justice Finley of the Washington
Supreme Court in Seattle v. Hill.1' Finley wrote in dissent of the court's
affirmance of appellant's conviction for public drunkenness, stating: "I can see
no rational basis for disallowing punishment because they are ill but approving
their punishment for involuntarily exhibiting a symptom of their illness."" 4
The principles set forth in these dissenting opinions were ultimately accepted
in two United States Courts of Appeals cases dealing with public intoxication
convictions of chronic alcoholics. In Easter v. District of Columbia,12 the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the appellant's conviction on the grounds
that one who is a chronic alcoholic cannot have the necessary mens rea to be held
criminally responsible for being drunk in public. In Driver v. Hinnant,126 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit termed alcoholism an "addiction," and
reversed Driver's conviction for public drunkenness. Judge Bunyan, writing for
the majority, asserted that:
Robinson v. California sustains if not commands the view we take . . .the

California statute criminally punished a "status"-drug addiction, while
act punishes an involuntary symptom of a status-public
the North Carolina
2
intoxication.
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These decisions seemed to signal the advent of a major constitutional challenge to the victimless crime of public drunkenness in cases involving chronic
alcoholics. But in 1968 the Supreme Court reversed this trend. In Powell v.
Texas," 8 the Court expressly refused to extend the Robinson principle to chronic
alcoholics convicted of public drunkenness. The Court held that a Texas statute
making it a crime to be "found in a state of intoxication in any public place"
could not be ipso facta held "irrational" in line with the Robinson reasoning.'29
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, asserted that Robinson did not
require reversal since Powell was not "convicted for being a chronic alcoholic,
but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion." 3 '
However, the decision of the Court in Powell left many important constitutional questions concerning public intoxication unanswered. In his concurring
opinion, for example, Mr. Justice White noted that had the trial record been
sufficient to support the conclusion that Powell was a chronic alcoholic with a
compulsion not only to drink in excess but also to frequent public places when
intoxicated, the eighth amendment might well have forbidden the conviction. 3 '
Moreover, the four dissenting justices who supported the extension of
Robinson voiced concern that the majority's holding in Powell failed to address
the central constitutional question presented. The dissenting opinions were characterized by that of Mr. Justice Fortas, who asserted that the distinction drawn
between Robinson and the instant case was unconvincing:
Criminal penalty may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change. .

.

. [T]he essential constitutional defect

here is the same as Robinson, for in both cases the particular defendant was
accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to change or
avoid.... [A] person may not be punished if the condition essential to condisease and is ocstitute the defined crime is a part of the pattern of 3his
2
casioned by a compulsion symptomatic of his disease.
Thus, despite the Powell decision, the ultimate impact that Robinson v.
California will have on such offenses as public drunkenness is uncertain. Constitutional questions in the area clearly remain, and as medical and psychological
data concerning alcoholism and drug addiction become more refined, the
courts may be less reluctant to give an expansive reading to the eighth amendment.
D. The Right to Treatment
The immediate constitutional issue raised by "compulsive" or "addictive"
behavior is also suggested in Powell and Robinson: the consideration of the defendant's right to treatment in such cases. As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out
in his concurring opinion in Robinson, "Addicts should be cured, not jailed.'
128
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Similarly, Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Powell expressed deep
concern over the indefinite sentence permissible in civil commitment proceedings
for public manifestation of the disease of alcoholism. He noted that the
alcoholic is merely confined until "cured," without any assurance that a cure
will be effected.'
These comments suggest a nascent judicial recognition of a right to, or at
least the state's responsibility for, the systematic treatment of compulsive offenders. Of course, the impact of the recognition of such a right would not be limited
to victimless crimes, but as the dicta in Robinson and Powell illustrate, the need
for treatment is most pronounced in the areas of drug abuse and alcoholism.
The Supreme Court has, in fact, taken significant steps in the direction of
extending formal recognition to the "right to treatment." In Jackson v.
Indiana,"' for example, the unanimous Court held that when an individual is
confined under commitment procedures, due process requires that the nature
and duration of confinement bear some relation to its purposes. Further, the
Court emphasized that its holding requires that the state either justify continued
confinement by therapeutic progress or release the patient. In a second case,
Humphrey v. Cady,"6 the Court termed a sex offender's claim that he was
receiving no treatment a "substantial constitutional claim," and noted that the
constitutionality of a "defective delinquent" statute must be viewed in terms of
the "criteria, procedures, and treatment" afforded.
In the light of these decisions, it seems likely that a "right to treatment" is in
the making. The recognition of such a right will have its most profound impact
upon victimless offenders who have been "oppressed and little more" for too
long, that is, those offenders who cannot voluntarily change their offensive
conduct.
Thus, the use of the criminal sanction to prohibit victimless crimes raises
many constitutional issues. Quite apart from the practical considerations which
recommend decriminalization, there are also constitutional principles which
demand it. These are: (1) the inherent limitations on the police power as
defined by substantive due process; (2) the right to privacy; and (3) the considerations surrounding the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Morever, even if criminal prohibition is retained, many
victimless offenses raise the question of the "right to treatment."
V. Conclusion
"Victimless crimes" are the best examples of a more general phenomenon
which can aptly be termed the over-reach of the criminal law. The criminal
justice system is simply not effective in regulating the vast array of conduct
presently governed by victimless crime statutes. Moreover, the imposition of the
criminal sanction in an attempt to regulate such conduct is, in many respects,
constitutionally suspect. As many federal and state studies have suggested, a
134
135
136

392 U.S. at 529.
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
405 U.S. 504 (1972).

[Vol. 52:995]

1013

NOTES

thorough reordering of criminal justice priorities is essential to remove victimless
crimes from the criminal codes."
In some cases, decriminalization is the only reform needed. The matter of
private sexual conduct between consenting adults, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, is simply not the state's concern. However, there are areas of conduct in which decriminalization must be accompanied by the establishment of
either state regulatory agencies or treatment facilities. Decriminalization of
prostitution and gambling requires state regulation of the legitimized "businesses." State regulation of legal prostitution, entailing localization and regular
medical inspections, has enjoyed notable success in the state of Nevada."' In
addition, taxation of the enterprise has provided an additional source of state
revenue. Gambling has also long been profitably regulated by that state, and a
similar system will soon be in effect in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Similarly,
pari-mutuel betting at racetracks represents a limited form of legalized gambling
from which some states realized significant revenue. 9 The adoption of state
lotteries, and the legalization of off-track betting in New York, further represent
means of producing revenue as well as stripping crime syndicates of the gambling monopoly they have enjoyed.14
Drug addiction and alcoholism are legitimate social concerns, although the
criminal justice system is ill-equipped to deal with the problems presented. Thus,
any legalization of the possession of drugs or public intoxication must be accompanied by the establishment of effective treatment facilities.
Some promising alternatives to the criminal sanction have been developed
for dealing with the public drunk. The Manhattan Bowery Project, conducted
by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City, is a notable example of a
viable treatment alternative. The Institute assembled teams of doctors and social
workers which regularly tour the Bowery section of New York seeking out
persons who are intoxicated. Such persons are offered the opportunity to commit themselves voluntarily to detoxification centers for treatment. The project
has demonstrated that alcoholics will voluntarily remove themselves from the
streets when they are offered the opportunity for medical treatment."" The St.
Louis Detoxification Center also represents the promise of such programs. 4 '
Similar projects have been effective in combatting the problems posed by drug
addiction. 4
Legislatures must be made aware not only of the problems posed by victimless crime statutes, but of the viable alternative measures which are available.
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The present policy of many enforcement agencies in not enforcing existing laws
or practicing selective enforcement upon only blatant offenders is not enough.
Such a policy serves no salutory purpose and has the adverse effect of engendering a disrespect for law in general. Legislative reform is essential, reform which
promises a more rational and effective answer to the problems of victimless crime
than the broad and indiscriminate sweep of the criminal sanction.
Joseph F. Winterscheid

